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Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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: INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

WEST'S INVOLVEMENT IS SOVIETS' ADVANTAGE IN AFRICA

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169 Oct 81 p 39

[Article by William Gutteridge: "Russia in Africa: The West's Reply"]

[Text]

THERE ARE SOME politicians both in the West and in Africa who regard the Soviet Union as inexorably committed to a grand design of global domination within some unspecified time scale. There are others, whose number has been progressively reduced by Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, who believe the USSR to be essentially benign and altruistic.

Both extremes seem to exaggerate the importance of ideology and neglect old-fashioned national self-interest. The best explanation of Soviet policy, especially in regions like Africa distant from the heartland, lies in the determination of Moscow's leadership to ensure national survival on the best terms possible.

The means often ruthlessly employed to this end inevitably include, in the historical context of Russia's development, the establishment of friendly regimes of a Marxist-Leninist character of which one object may be the control of sources of raw materials partly to be able if necessary to deny them to a potential enemy.

Help likely

Assistance to armed struggles for liberation is also likely, provided that a satisfactory outcome in terms of Soviet self-interest is reasonably predictable.

An important question is whether those who accept Soviet military assistance to achieve their nationalist ends

necessarily prove lasting friends to their patrons or become sound ideological allies, even temporarily. On the face of it, there is no reason why Oliver Tambo of the ANC or Sam Nujoma of SWAPO should not be just as realistic as those who from time to time supply their weapons. Where else should they turn for military as opposed to economic assistance?

It is, however, their well-documented link with Moscow which has enabled the government of South Africa continually to ascribe the Republic's troubles almost exclusively to the Soviet threat. This assumption led first to the generic labelling of all opponents white and black, of the regime as "Communist". Prime Minister Botha in a recent election speech lumped together "Communism, Marxism and radicalism" and claimed that by their criticisms the White opposition newspapers were doing the Soviet Union's work for her.

The failure to distinguish between African Socialism, Marxism or Black nationalism on the one hand and a close dedication to Moscow's cause on the other has also effectively distorted judgments in South Africa on Robert Mugabe's accession to power in Zimbabwe, in spite of his patently cautious approach to the Soviet relationship.

By focussing on and using as a scapegoat the external threat, the Pretoria Government has not only distorted its policies, internal and external, but

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become hung on its own rhetoric and put obstacles in the way of any serious reform.

"Communists did not invent discrimination, they merely capitalised on it," Sir David Scott, formerly British ambassador to South Africa, wrote recently. By doing so he highlighted Pretoria's real problem - how to persuade white South Africans that the problems stemming from apartheid are mainly of their own creation.

It is one thing for Afrikaner South Africa to think in terms of radical change. It is quite another to forget the past and think of "peaceful coexistence" with neighbours like Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique. The Republic's cross-border raids are progressively forcing at least the latter two back into the arms of Soviet oriented friends and so increasing the direct military risk to South Africa.

It is surprising that the old lesson of Vietnam and many other places needs to be learnt again - that in the end, faced with passionate nationalism, Marxist-tinged or not, there is no lasting military victory.

The fact is that stability in Southern Africa and other parts of the continent is not in the end a matter of the imposition of authority by alien powers, whether of East or West. An admittedly uneasy balance of forces is only going to emerge on the basis of the emergence of politically independent African states enjoying the right to develop and to trade on a reasonably equitable basis.

The lessons of Soviet involvement in Africa and of American intervention elsewhere are that permanent suzerainty, is a rare achievement. Over 20 years, from Guinea via Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and Ethiopia, the Soviet Union has suffered more setbacks than successes. Even where communist political influence for the time being remains, economic links with the West have generally continued. Gulf oil remains active in Angola and other US

interests prevailed and expanded in Algeria, even during the revolutionary period.

Zimbabwe in some ways continues, in spite of an extraordinary British reluctance really generously to support the new state, to exemplify the balance. The British at least are right not to make a major issue, as the Americans would if they could, of North Korean military training for a Zimbabwean army contingent.

Incomprehensible

Robert Mugabe symbolises the priority of national development over ideological considerations and, in the circumstances, the pressures against Zimbabwean labour working in South Africa are incomprehensible. Pretoria, especially in view of the proclaimed concept of a "constellation of states", seems to be acting against its own self-interest, of which presumably a main instrument is economic interdependence.

The Soviet Union has no in-built advantage in its dealing with African states other than the West's involvement with South Africa. It has the power and inclination to assist in liberation struggles, it has not the capacity to consolidate the presumably consequent peace. African leaders, especially in the immediate post-independence stage, need investment and the capacity to trade.

Historically, in spite of the apparent circumstances, in particular the inertia of South Africa's white population towards radical reform, the initiative lies with Western countries who could if they tried now emerge as the champions of independent Africa.

The weakness is in the continued Western response to imagined, or at least unproven, Soviet plans and motivation rather than the development of a constructive approach to the problems of African states based on mutual economic interest●

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

KOLINGBA, DACKO BELIEVED TO HAVE PLOTTED TRANSFER OF POWER

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169, Oct 81 pp 50, 51

[Article by Alan Rake]

[Text]

DAVID DACKO was the first President when his country at the very heart of the African continent became independent in August 1960. He was toppled from power the first time when his Chief of Staff and close relative Jean Bedel Bokassa seized power in the St. Sylvester's Day coup on January 1, 1966.

Last month the tired, reluctant ruler, suffering from high blood pressure and totally disillusioned with trying to run his impoverished country, was persuaded by his army chief to abandon power, bloodlessly.

Take-over

On the morning of Tuesday September 1, head of the army, General André Kolingba announced that he had taken over. A 23-member committee of "military recovery," all soldiers was set up. The civilian constitution was suspended and an entirely military Cabinet was formed.

Early reports said that General Kolingba would organise elections within a few weeks to return a new civilian government to power. Since then, however, it has become clear that the new man intends to stay in power until his country is on the way to recovery. He said recently: "Let the politicians stay in their corners. When order is restored I will see what has to be done to pass power back to them."

André Kolingba has only recently emerged into the limelight. Dacko had promoted him head of the army in July,

following a bomb explosion in a Bangui cinema earlier in the month in which three people were killed and 38 wounded.

Dacko declared a state of emergency and banned the opposition parties and Kolingba warned looters and "those building barricades" of the dire consequences. He promoted many loyal officers and thoroughly re-organised the 2,000-strong army. But he stressed that the military could not save the country and what was needed was new political leadership.

Said Kolingba in his first interview: "I have tried to increase the awareness of the Central African people, but I kept coming up against the political parties. They and the government were like two punch-drunk boxers. Someone had to stop them; the public was waiting. In the public interest I intervened."

He said that what was needed was discipline and a period that would "leave our hands free to re-organise the country and lay the foundations for its economic recovery". He did not know how long the military would have to stay in power.

Leaders needed

Commenting on his all-military Cabinet, he said: "Perhaps not all the ministers are qualified, but they are leaders and we have the technicians already. Above all we need leaders and when everything is in order the rest will follow."

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Meanwhile, he has appealed to the French Government to pay the salaries of the civil servants for at least a year. He added: "We would like to keep the privileged relations we have always had with France, and it would be ungrateful of us to wish anything else, given the sentimental and historical links that unite us."

Significantly, the French were not obviously involved in last month's putsch. Their garrisons, totaling 1,600 troops near the capital and at Bouar in the north-west of the country, remained in their barracks. The Mitterrand Government does not want to be accused of intervening in African affairs in the style of his predecessor, Giscard d'Estaing, who actually toppled Bokassa in "Operation Barracuda" in September 1979.

But though the French Minister for Co-operation and Development Jean Pierre Cot has stated that "France had no business to intervene in an entirely internal problem", his government was relieved to see Dacko go.

A new French ambassador presented his credentials to Dacko only 24 hours before he was ousted. France had been propping up the crumbling edifice since Dacko came to power two years ago.

Huge deficit

The economy has been a disaster. The balance of payments and government budgets were in huge deficit and heavily dependent on French subvention. The principal exports of cotton, coffee and timber collapsed. At the same time, diamonds were being smuggled to such an extent that actual production or export figures are almost impossible to assess.

Bokassa bankrupted the country with extravagance and mismanagement. His coronation as Emperor cost £14-million in a country where the average income per head at £250 per year is among the lowest in Africa. But David Dacko was able to do little to improve the situation.

He had political trouble from the outset, being harassed by opposition parties both inside and outside the country. It was the Oubangui Patriotic Front (FLO), led by Adolphe Idi Lala and supported by ex-Minister Abel Goumba, that claimed responsibility for the July bombing. Inside the country opposition crystallised around Ange Patasse, the man who stood

against Dacko and lost the presidential elections in March.

Dacko spent his time in political manoeuvres fighting for survival. He dismissed his Deputy Premier and Vice-President and re-shuffled his Cabinet many times.

He clashed with the unions and students and though he tried to maintain a semblance of democracy he occasionally lapsed into Bokassa-style repression. He was compromised because he depended on too many Bokassa men in the top and middle ranks of his government and could not govern without them.

Towards the end he showed how tired he was of the political treadmill. "It cannot go on like this," he once said in an unguarded moment to a journalist. He gave the impression of a man at the end of his tether, unable to achieve political stability or economic progress.

And each month he had to face the persistent humiliation of begging his French mentors for sufficient money to pay the civil servants. When last month his time came to go and take up residence again at his coffee plantation in Mokinda, he was a man relieved of a great burden.

But will André Kolingba be able to do any better?

Though the French took no overt part in actually carrying out the coup - their troops stayed in barracks throughout - evidence is now emerging which shows that the ousting of Dacko was done with their connivance. Indeed it seems likely that Dacko and Kolingba mutually agreed to a peaceful transfer of power.

French disillusion with Dacko set in shortly after he returned to power. But it was not until the Giscard Government was replaced by that of President Mitterrand in May that Dacko's performance was re-appraised.

Cinema blast

Instead of progressing towards democracy, Dacko had used the excuse of the July cinema explosion for a complete crackdown, banning the opposition parties of Dr Abel Goumba, leader of the Oubangui Patriotic Front (FPO) and the former Prime Minister Ange Patasse who leads the Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC).

Patasse had an interesting record. He had been Bokassa's Prime Minister in the

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mid-1970s. He resigned in 1978 after quarrelling with Bokassa and left the country to set up an opposition in Paris. He returned from exile in October 1979 but was immediately detained. He escaped, but was caught last November trying to cross the Chad frontier. A year later, Dacko released him from prison in November 1980 because his health had deteriorated, but he recovered enough to stand against Dacko in the presidential elections of March 1981, in which Dacko scraped home with just over 50 per cent of the votes in an election where there were allegations of considerable electoral malpractice. He then left to live in Paris.

The ban on Patasse and Dr Abel Goumba was later lifted, but neither leader was able to play a proper part as a constitutional opponent as Dacko was bitterly suspicious of them both.

Dacko tried to preserve his position by putting his faith entirely in the army. He promoted Kolingba Chief-of-Staff and allowed him to reward his subordinates with sizeable promotions and more pay. Kolingba was already close to the French and soon demonstrated that he was a typical product of French military training – tough, disciplined and sure that a clean sweep by the army could purify the nation. He has total disdain for all politicians.

Close contact

In August, Kolingba and the French were already in close contact. The French Government assured him that they would not interfere if he could take over quickly, with the minimum of bloodshed.

It appears that the new French ambassador, Pierre Couturier, knew all about Dacko's planned overthrow when he presented his credentials 24 hours before.

There is also evidence that Dacko connived at his own downfall. He was tired of governing, of failing health, and felt that he could not resist the challenge of Ange Patasse and the other rivals indefinitely. He decided he should hand over peacefully to his own soldiers – whom he had promoted – rather than wait for a violent coup. If he went peacefully his safety and domestic tranquillity would be assured, if he hung on he could be killed or forced into exile.

So after seeing the French ambassador, and probably discussing the handover planned for that same evening, he left for his farm 60 miles away at Mokinda. In

doing that he knew he was unprotected. Even his 100-strong presidential guard was left behind at the palace.

Well-informed Paris sources go even further. They say that Dacko's deposition was indeed fixed mutually between himself and General Kolingba in advance. Dacko had learnt that the French would not support him and wanted Kolingba to take over so he took the opportunity to go peacefully.

The French newspaper *Libération* reported that a few days before the coup the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, had telephoned President Mitterrand to tell him that he had been in conversation with one of Dacko's sons who had told him that his father planned to retire. Bongo had earlier been pressing Dacko, at the instigation of Paris, to push for more democracy.

Though Dacko had lifted the state of emergency and had lifted the ban on opposition parties, this actually added to his feeling of insecurity and made him even less inclined to continue the unending struggle with his political opponents.

Ritual blame

So did Dacko and Kolingba plot the transfer of power between them? All the evidence points to this direction. Since his assumption of power, Kolingba has gone through the ritual of condemning corruption of the old regime – "the cock-fighting politicians" – and the general lack of discipline. But he has not imprisoned his opponents or purged the civil service.

Bangui radio reports daily on the energy of the new ruler who is "working tirelessly to cleanse the nation." There are also verbal attacks on "corrupt officials who embezzle and steal" – but nothing is directed personally against Dacko, who has his feet up at his farm.

Meanwhile Kolingba and the new French ambassador Couturier are as close as peas in a pod. The French troops remain in their barracks and Bangui is reported calm, with the police and customs officials acting as if nothing had changed under the bright African sunshine.

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MAIN OPPOSITION GROUPS	LEADER
PARTY Oubangui Liberation Front (FLO) Oubangui Patriotic Front (FPO)	Sylvestre Bangui Adolphe Idi Lala Dr Abel Goumba
Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC) Student Movement (ANECA) Union Générale des Travailleurs Centrafricains (UGTC)	Ange Patasse Sani Cole Note: Patasse and Goumba came together to form the Provisional Political Committee (CPP) in Paris recently, calling for Dacko's resignation and free elections●

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LIBERIA

EXECUTED SYEN LINKED WITH SELF-EXILED TIPOTEH

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169 Oct 81 pp 17-18

[Article by Nana Humasi: "Liberia: The Drama Behind the Execution of Syen"]

[Text]

THE EXECUTION in August of Liberian Deputy Head of State Major-General Wey Syen, charged with plotting a counter coup, pointed to tensions forced by the People's Redemption Council (PRC) since it came to power some 17 months ago. The PRC is composed of a military council and a civilian Cabinet of all shades of politics. This has complicated the smooth running of government machinery.

"Wey Syen turned out to be on the other side of almost every decision the Chairman would take," said John Morais, the Liberian information attaché at his country's London embassy. "Syen would sometimes call press conferences to contradict decisions taken by the council and Cabinet." He referred to the deputy head's bitter opposition to the council's decision to sever links with Libya and to close that country's People's Bureau in Monrovia.

Discovery inevitable

This kind of tension increased. Syen's faction tried hard to push his ideas to the front. This became embarrassing. Syen became a hindrance. With such mistrust between the two heads of any junta, the discovery of a coup plot was almost inevitable. It indicates profound divisions within the ranks of the PRC.

The killing of Syen, the firing of Cheapoo, the resignation of Economic Planning Minister Dr Togbah Nah Tipoteh, seem to diagnose a house cleaning act against the very hardliners of the PRC.

Syen was an outspoken radical. Cheapoo was considered to be the most feared of the hardliners. And Tipoteh's socialist economics did not please Master Sergeant Samuel Doe.

Dr. Tipoteh resigned while on a mission to the World Bank in the Ivory Coast. His letter, which reached Monrovia while Syen was on trial said: "The enemies of the revolution are using the old but effective strategy of sowing the seeds of suspicion in the council and Cabinet ... and (have) become stronger and stronger until key members of the government have eliminated themselves ... I have been working under great pressure and severe risks."

The government replied charging the former minister with betrayal of the Liberian people, and with deserting the army into which he was, along with his Cabinet colleagues, inducted last July as a major.

Master Sergeant Doe said in the statement that the resignation had many implications, basic to which was Tipoteh's fear of consequences since his name was principally linked with the Wey Syen abortive coup attempt. He went on to say that Dr. Tipoteh's own personality and socialist orientation rendered him incapable of negotiating much needed loans with international financiers and donor countries.

Dr. Tipoteh's letter, however, claims that during his office the meagre \$5-million found in the vaults of the Bank of Liberia at the April 1980 takeover had grown giving Liberia over \$1-billion in

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recurrent expenditure, and a four year development plan to the tune of \$600-million.

A report from Liberia described the elimination of Syen as the completion of the removal of all serious opposition to Doe. But it also leaves the PRC without a backbone. So far, the council has tried and executed five of its original band of 17. Tipoteh's resignation constitutes a severe blow to Doe's strength, an observer commented. He was a key finance policymaker, he said.

Contrary to initial press reports from Monrovia, Dr Tipoteh has not sought asylum in the Ivory Coast. A senior government official in Abidjan told *New African* that under the free movement of persons clauses in the ECOWAS agreement, Dr Tipoteh was free to arrive at and depart from the Ivory Coast without any contact with the government. The source who asked to remain anonymous, said Dr. Tipoteh has not sought asylum, and did not need to if he wished to stay in the country. Dr. Tipoteh himself could not be reached for comment in Abidjan or Dakar.

Asylum request

A request for asylum from Tipoteh would have created an intriguing situa-

tion for the Ivory Coast Government. The country still harbours Adolphus Benedict Tolbert, stepson-in-law of President Houphouet Boigny, and son of Liberia's ex-President William Tolbert, executed during the Doe takeover.

"The minister was smart to smell a rat," said an observer from the London School of Oriental and African Studies. "The silencing of the Left within the PRC is clear to everybody. Such power struggles are inevitable in a grouping like the PRC. It was similar with Jerry Rawlings and Boakye Djan: Mengistu Mariam and Brigadier Teferi Bante, and Lieutenant Colonel Atnafu Abate."

The house-cleaning theory holds when viewed within the context of Liberia's heavy dependence on American aid, and the rising anti-Leftist foreign policy generated by the Reagan Administration. Chester Crocker, the US Secretary of State for African Affairs would be more at ease with the socialist or Marxist elements out of the PRC.

Liberia may resist a swing to the Left. But if the soldiers, whom noted sociologist Ali Mazrui describes as the *lumpen militariat* lay their hands on the goodies of high living and political privilege, the Liberian masses might begin to think of a second revolution.

For it would mean that the Messiahs had become the taskmasters●

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NAMIBIA

SWAPO SEEN DEVELOPING MILITARY, POLITICAL 'MUSCLE'

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169 Oct 81 pp 25-26

[Article by Peter Katjavivi]

[Text]

AT THE HEIGHT of the South African invasion of Angola some 3,000 members and supporters of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) gathered at a rally in Namibia's capital Windhoek. The aim: to demonstrate their political muscle in response to South African repression and to commemorate Namibia Day (August 26).

The rally was broken up by South African policemen and immediately afterwards six leading SWAPO members - including high-ranking nationalists Emmanuel Ngatjizeko and Gabriel Shikongo - were arrested and held without charge.

The significance of such an event should not be missed. It was 15 years ago, in 1966, that SWAPO embarked upon direct armed struggle as a means of winning independence and ending the illegal South African occupation of the territory. This followed years of protest demonstrations and marches, including some of the most vigorous actions ever seen in the history of the Namibian struggle. All these peaceful demonstrations were, however, then as now, suppressed violently by the South African regime.

As SWAPO marks the 15 years of armed struggle in a series of events in Namibia and throughout the world, we can look back and observe the significant achievements it has made at home and abroad. During those years SWAPO has grown in size and scope, transforming itself into a formidable movement with extensive political and military networks.

SWAPO's skills have also developed at diplomatic and international levels. There is no doubt that it was the combined pressures of these political, military and diplomatic actions which forced the South African regime to negotiate directly with SWAPO at the Geneva conference last January.

It is also the increasing pressure from SWAPO and from the international community which is frustrating South Africa's attempts to install a client-regime of its choice in Namibia.

SWAPO's success, it seems, has pushed South Africa into its recent desperate attacks on Angola aimed, the South Africans claim, at cutting off SWAPO's logistic lines. This claim makes South Africa look stupid because SWAPO's base is not in Angola but in Namibia where its support lies. SWAPO's military wing, PLAN, remains intact and, it is evident, its determination to continue the war of liberation remains undimmed.

South Africa itself is in no doubt about the strength of support for SWAPO within Namibia. Its response is to intensify police and army victimisation of the civilian population, with the aim of intimidating people from supporting SWAPO. Also, it is stalling negotiations over implementation of the United Nations plan for fair and free elections in Namibia.

Contrary to the optimistic pronouncements of the US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, no real progress has been made on the negotiation front. The South African suppression of peaceful demonst-

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rations and refusal to heed the aspirations of the Namibian people, came to a head in the Windhoek shootings of December 10, 1959. Eleven people were killed by the South African army and police as they demonstrated against their forced removal to the apartheid-style township now known as Katutura, literally "no dwelling place of our own".

Those cold-blooded murders served as one of the many bitter lessons learned in the history of the Namibian struggle for freedom. They hardened the attitude of Namibians as far as the tactics of their struggle were concerned. So, too, will the hearts of Africans in Angola be hardened in resolve after this latest round of brutal and unprovoked South African attacks. Although Angola has borne and continues to bear, human and material losses, it continues to stand firm in support of the liberation struggle in Namibia.

Equally significant was the decision of the International Court of Justice at The Hague on June 18, 1966. This sidestepped the issue of South African misrule in Namibia and refused to pass judgement, thus adding injury to the already sore hearts of Namibians.

It was immediately after the World Court's indecision that SWAPO launched the armed struggle. The reactions of Namibians to the failure of the international community to come to their aid was expressed during his trial in Pretoria in 1966 by Herman ya Toivo, one of the SWAPO leaders condemned to 20 years imprisonment on Robben Island: "While the World Court judgement was pending

I at least had that to fall back on. When we failed after years of waiting, I had no answer to give to my people."

Well-trained

Recent months have seen a series of continuous military encounters between the South African occupation forces and SWAPO fighters. The well-trained and equipped guerrillas are tying down more than 80,000 South African troops. The rise in the tempo of guerrilla actions in Namibia, coupled with the recent highly successful military operations of the African National Congress of South Africa, has taken its toll on the South African racist regime. The recent increases in defence spending (now R2.8-billion) announced by South African Finance Minister Senator Owen Horwood confirms these successes.

A Washington-based journalist who returned from an extended visit to Namibia last month described the situation there as similar to that in Vietnam just before the collapse of the regime in Saigon.

He was not only struck by the extent of the South African military presence throughout the places he visited, but also by the type of stories he picked up in local bars, which were reminiscent of those told by demoralised Americans and their allies in Saigon.

If there is a certainty in the confused Namibia situation it is that if international negotiations over independence fail, the war will escalate to new heights●

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SENEGAL

ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT OF PDS WITH LIBYA POSING PROBLEM FOR REGIME

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1085, 21 Oct 81 pp 18-21

[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Senegal: Is Wade Guilty?"]

[Text] A police investigation has revealed that the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] had a "Military Council" in liaison with Libya. What is the truth in this?

"We brought weapons into Senegal from Mauritania and the Mauritanian Government knew it. We crossed the river at Rosso (northeast) and handed over 40,000 CFA francs to the boatman. Once on the Senegalese shore at Saint Louis, we paid 150,000 CFA francs to the customs officer. On 5 August, we hid the weapons at Keur Massar (about 25 kilometers from Dakar) in the orchard of Wade (lawyer). We went back to get them on 7 August so we could distribute them throughout the regions."

This, in essence, is the reported admission of Amadou Fall, a former Senegalese Army officer who was originally arrested (on 28 August) for fraud and who called himself a member of a "Military Council" (secret) of the PDS and bodyguard of Abdoulaye Wade, national secretary general of the PDS. Fall subsequently recanted, stating that these "admissions" were reportedly forced out of him under torture. However, given the seriousness of the revelations, the legal machinery was already in motion. For the first time in 20 years in Senegal, a government appears to apply the law to the letter to fight an opposition party. Questioning of PDS members has been conducted on a large scale and, according to the Minister of Justice, a preliminary investigation "concerning an attack on the security of the state" was opened on 20 September.

On 12 September, i.e. less than a week after the alleged importation of the weapons, police appeared at Wade's secondary residence in Keu Massar. The villa was thoroughly searched by the team headed by Lieutenant Diop. Abdoulaye Wade's chauffeur and the property guard were arrested. Three workers who were picked up on the premises were released the day after following an interrogation. Late in the morning of Monday, 14 September, police appeared at the PDS headquarters on 7 Tiong Street which also houses Wade's office. The latter was at that time out of Dakar. Ousmane Ngom, deputy national secretary for foreign relations, Talla Fall and Sheikh Tidiane Sene, the latter two mere employees in the office of the politician-lawyer, reportedly attempted to prevent the search. They were immediately taken away and were subsequently charged with resisting police authorities.

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On Tuesday, 15 September, the police thought they had put their finger on the "boss" of the famous PDS "Military Council," Allassane Sissoko, director of the ISEFI [Senegalese Institute for Training and Information] who reportedly, together with a certain Ndiak Dieng, channelled weapons from Mauritania with Amadou Fall. Allassane Sissoko's home as well as the ISEFI offices were searched during the entire day of Thursday, 17 September.

Also on Thursday, PDS regional officers were also questioned; Papa Moussa Faye and Moussa Ba of the Saint Louis communal section; Boubacar Sall, chairman of the Thies section; and especially Doudou Camara, deputy from Kolda and member of the national secretariat whose parliamentary immunity was lifted on 1 October prior to his arrest. Doudou Camara also reportedly confessed. The list is not complete and certain individuals who were released were once again questioned. At the end of the first week of October, eight militants were charged, including two former officers, Amadou Fall and Gana Mbengue, and the deputy, Camara. The PDS leaders showed calmness. Abdoulaye Wade told us in Paris, "We have requested our militants to be ready for the investigation and not to object to questioning." He added, "The officers in charge of the investigation have not found any weapons and they will not find any."

Presumptions were nevertheless strong if one were to believe certain high-ranking PS [Socialist Party] officers in power. On 24 September, the political office of President Abdou Diouf's party brought up the subject. However, to show the split between government and party, no reference was made in the communique published at the end of the meeting. Nevertheless, according to some indiscreet remarks made, the PS leadership is convinced "that the affair is very serious," and it is affirmed that from the admissions made "it is apparent that several PDS militants reportedly had undergone training in the handling of explosives in Libya." Confirmation of this was officially made on 1 October by the Minister of Justice. The word Libya has been let out and the specter of Qadhdhafi floats over Dakar. This doubtlessly explains the Senegalese government's vigorous reaction.

The uneasiness of the Abdou Diouf team is real. This is not the first time that a Libyan network has been indicted in the region. In Senegal itself an "ayatollah" showed up 2 years ago in Kaolack and proclaimed total war against the Leopold Sedar Senghor regime....to begin in the first part of 1980. Nothing happened. On the other hand, neighboring Mauritania experienced grave difficulties that year when Libyan liaison with certain high-ranking officials was discovered. Above all, Senegal is not ready to forget the coup attempt in Gambia in which Dakar has always seen Qadhdhafi's hand. The Senegalese have therefore remained on the alert and it has sufficed that the revelations of a more or less shady character would bring into play the self-defense reflex. The immediate objective: establish proof of a connection (military and financial) between the PDS and Tripoli.

To believe the PDS leaders, the investigation will not establish this proof. The number two man in the party, Fara N'Diaye, told us, "The police searched my office. I had a Libya file which they took away. However, the file contained only ordinary documents. I was also in Libya 2 years ago on a very official basis and I brought back, for example, Qadhdhafi's Green Book. How could this be

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proof of compromise?" Moreover, the PDS does not hide the fact that it has "normal" relations with Tripoli. Two years ago, a delegation of 14 party leaders went to Libya. Included among these leaders was, besides Abdoulaye Wade and Fara N'Diaye, Deputy Doudou Camara, who is today presented as the link pin between the PDS and Qadhafi.

Nevertheless, nothing--at least on the surface--has as yet been able to be really established. In the beginning of October, the investigation appears justified only through the admissions made. However, what belief can there be in the latter?

The man who started the affair, Amadou Fall, the "conveyer of weapons," has recanted. However, he had already gone too far when he introduced himself as a member of a PDS "Military Council." Mr Wade's party answers, "We do not have a Military Council. On the other hand, it is true that Amadou Fall was responsible for the close protection of the secretary general." Wade himself nevertheless recognizes that he acted with some "thoughtlessness" when he confided his security to such a questionable character whom he now suspects as being an agitator infiltrated into his ranks by his adversaries.

Amadou Fall was actually a lieutenant in the Senegalese army. Fara N'Diaye told us that Fall had offered his services to the PDS by stating that "he had been transferred to reserve duty in the army. He was discharged in December 1980." However, according to military sources, Lieutenant Fall's name was stricken from the army cadres list because he reportedly had been surprised in the act of photocopying documents of interest to national defense. Since that time, however, according to Abdoulaye Wade, "He has been drawing his salary from budget of the army general staff." The army admits that "he is actually receiving a pension as a former officer."

In any case, Fall was at the side of the PDS secretary general in July. Not without reason, the latter states that he needed security. However, the bodyguard was led astray in a common case of fraud: an unpaid debt to a Dakar company to which he had shown his officer card so as not to pay anything. Hence, his arrest "for fraud and unauthorized use of title" (he had to hand over his officer card when he left the army).

According to some sources, it was while looking for this card that the officers in charge of the investigation reportedly discovered the documents which led to the suspicion of the PDS relations with Tripoli: military instruction handbooks in Arabic "relating to sabotage techniques," and a "diary describing the life of PDS militants in a training camp in Libya." Amadou Fall not only admits that he brought weapons into Senegal but also that he reportedly underwent training in Libya together with six PDS militants to be instructed in urban guerrilla warfare. The PDS affirms that it has acted in good faith: it is not a crime to go to Libya. Nevertheless, Wade questions "how Fall could have taken along with him PDS militants to Libya." The PDS boss, in fact, now recognizes the fact that some of his comrades could have gone to Qadhafi's country without his knowledge. However, for him "the Amadou Fall" affair is a provocation of certain elements of the Socialist Party to discredit his own party. "An agitator has been infiltrated

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into our ranks. An attempt is being made to establish that we are in the pay of Libya." In fact, if proof could be established that the PDS has received subsidies from a foreign power, that would mean his death sentence. Fara N'Diaye told us, "All hypotheses are possible. Attempts are perhaps being made to divide us by proving to us that our secretary general acted alone (with Libya implied) without informing us of anything whatsoever." Fara N'Diaye knows that he is looked upon in Kakar not only as the ideal successor of Wade to head the PDS but also as more respected interlocutor in the eyes of President Abdou Diouf.

For the moment, however, the two PDS leaders are in basic agreement: "Certain bigwigs of the government or the Socialist Party want to liquidate us." For Abdoulaye Wade, the maneuver is clear: "Everything is being done to discredit us because they are afraid of us. Between now and the 1983 elections (presidential and legislative), certain parallel institutions want us to disappear. The Socialist Party does not want the PDS opposite it. It wants only small parties as interlocutors." Wade considers the latter as "the remainder, that is the theory," whereas the big parties are only the PS, the PDS and "the cell of Marxists."

Either through machinations of the government or thoughtlessness of the opposition, the affair can now no longer be covered up. A dismissal of the case pronounced by the court would risk discrediting the government somewhat and restoring the fortune of Wade who would not complain about that. If, on the other hand, the thesis of Libyan collusion were to be proved, Senegalese democracy would suffer from it: some could profit from it by saying that the Africans do not know how to practice democracy. It would be all the more detrimental since it all started not with the capture of a freedom fighter but with the arrest of a swindler.

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SENEGAL

WADE'S ATTENDANCE AT LIBYAN CONGRESS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1085, 21 Oct 81 p 20

[Article by M.S.: "Wade in Tripoli"]

[Text] Having come to the Libyan capital to participate in the Congress of Solidarity with the Jamahiriya (28-31 August), the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] secretary general extended his visit. First of all, to attend the 1 September festivities and possibly to meet with Col Muammar Qadhdhafi. This meeting, which in the end did not take place, would not have been anything special. The Jamahiriya leader always receives, in similar circumstances, the heads of foreign delegations who had come to offer him their support. Wade was not especially happy with this meeting but it had been proposed to him. However, he waited in vain for 15 days without leaving, or almost so, his hotel room so as not to miss the fateful moment.

Abdoulaye Wade was not mysterious about his presence in the Libyan capital. He received journalists, granted interviews to one and all, most often on the hotel terrace.

I myself met him several times. We spoke at length about Senegal, Africa, Libya....Wade confided to me his preoccupation concerning ties between Tripoli and certain members of his party. He confided to me on several occasions, "I would really like to know who in the PDS is in touch with the Libyans."

The PDS leader did not benefit from any special treatment. Even though he was constantly escorted by a "guide," nothing more was done for him than for a hundred or so politicians present at the same time in Tripoli. He nevertheless knew that this trip did not please the Senegalese Government. He told me, "You will see. There will be much speculation on my trip to Libya..."

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SENEGAL

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ECONOMY CAUSING CONCERN--In West Africa, it is the economic future of Senegal which is causing the sponsors of international funds and the other member states of the UMOA [West African Monetary Union] the most concern. For the immediate future, the country does not have resources which would permit its development. However, being politically mature, the Senegalese would not be able to accept the fact of permanent economic underdevelopment. [Text]
[Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1085, 21 Oct 81 p 32] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 5671

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SOUTH AFRICA

ALLIANCE WITH UNITED STATES CALLED UNHOLY

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169 Oct 81 pp 10-13

[Article by Mark August: "The Unholy Alliance in Action in Africa"]

[Text]

SOUTH AFRICA'S latest invasion of Angola, and the developments following that action, have effectively turned Southern Africa into an even more volatile and highly militarised sub-continent – preparing the ground, as it were, for more widespread, intensive and bloodier battles to come.

It has done something else. It has revealed to the world an alliance between South Africa and the Reagan Administration of the United States which, despite its predictability, is quite breathtaking in its concept and so potentially dangerous it has been dubbed "unholy" by some Western nations as well as by most African leaders.

The misadventure

The invasion has thrown light on the direction of the hitherto vague Africa policy of the United States. There is growing evidence that the South African action was undertaken, in part anyway, as a result of current ultra-conservative attitudes dominating the White House. The Reagan Administration is considered by the South Africans to be amenable to the general thrust of its own designs in Southern Africa.

South Africa's misadventure in Angola has several aims. The Pretoria Government, contrary to its tired claims that it had mounted the operation in pursuit of SWAPO guerrillas, is known to be set on de-stabilising the Angolan Government – and, indeed, some of the other independent African governments in the region.

There are many who believe that Pretoria, which acts as if it has *carte blanche*

in the region, sees itself enacting the same role as the Israelis in the Middle East. It has been noted in diplomatic circles and by military analysts that there are several striking similarities between recent aggressive actions of the South Africans and those of the Israelis. Interestingly, the reaction by the US Administration has also tended to be similar in both situations.

Like the Israelis, who have installed a surrogate Christian Lebanese presence in South Lebanon led by Major Sa'ad Haddad, Pretoria appears to have planned that the pliant Jonas Savimbi, leader of the rebel UNITA faction, should be in a position of control in southern Angola. In doing this, the South Africans probably intend to weaken Angolan Government control – a position from which Pretoria hopes to force Luanda to compromise on its strong support for SWAPO. The other purpose of the invasion was ostensibly to maul SWAPO so much that it would be incapable of playing an active role in support of the Namibians inside that much-disputed territory.

According to South African and other sources, Pretoria opted for a military solution in Namibia after intelligence reports indicated that SWAPO would win more than 50 per cent of the poll if an internationally-supervised election was held in Namibia.

The report, coming in the aftermath of the humiliation of South African-supported Bishop Abel Muzorewa at the polls in Zimbabwe and in which Robert Mugabe's ZANU won a landslide victory, sent cold shivers down Pretoria's spine.

White minority rulers in South Africa

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are determined to resist a government led by SWAPO in Namibia - and they have chosen a military alternative in a desperate bid to solve the problem.

Buffer state

The invasion of Angola had several objectives. The South Africans had planned to divert the Angolan armed forces to give Jonas Savimbi's UNITA a free hand for its campaign of terrorism in southern Angola. It was Pretoria's reasoning that if Savimbi could establish a buffer zone the activities of SWAPO could be checked since Savimbi is an arch foe of SWAPO and would deny the guerrillas access through southern Angola.

Don McHenry, former US ambassador to the United Nations, told *New African* that the attitude of the Reagan Administration has given Pretoria the impression that the US supports its actions in the region. "I fear that the South Africans will take the atmosphere now created as a blank cheque to do what they like".

McHenry strongly criticised the US Administration's policy on Africa. He said: "This administration's policy is extremely shortsighted. It will succeed in isolating the US not only from the rest of Africa, but also from our allies in Europe".

He charged that the US had reverted to a policy of placing material values over moral values. The Reagan Administration was paying only lip-service to moral issues, he said. McHenry questioned America's official determination to achieve a peaceful solution in Namibia.

Delaying tactics

Randall Robinson, executive director of the lobby group Trans-Africa, said in an interview with *New African* that there were no signs that the US was determined to achieve a peaceful solution in Namibia. He added: "The United States has as much interest as South Africa in delaying the peace process in Namibia".

A highly placed official in the US State Department elaborated on the objectives of Reagan policy on Africa. The official, who asked not to be named, said the Reagan Administration was committed to the following:

To seek to promote peace and regional security and to deny opportunities to those "who seek contrary objectives"; to

support "proven friends" and be known as a reliable partner; to maintain open market opportunities, access to key resources and contribute to expanding African and American economies; to support a negotiated solution to the problems of Southern Africa; to seek to expand that group of nations whose development policies produce economic progress and which have democratic institutions; to help meet Africa's humanitarian needs and foster basic human liberties in keeping with American principles and American interests.

Bill Gray, the US Democratic congressman, expressed his doubts about American policy on Africa. He told *New African* that the Reagan Administration had missed its priorities. "US priority" he said, "should be to demilitarise the African continent, not encourage a military build-up."

Gray believes that the "almost acquiescent US official position" has encouraged intransigence by the Pretoria Government. Gray cites the US veto in the UN Security Council of a resolution condemning South Africa for its invasion of Angola as one of the factors giving "white" South Africa its feeling of confidence.

He cites the visit to Washington earlier this year by senior South African military intelligence officers as further proof. "The United States is clearly supporting South Africa and, therefore, apartheid. We in the US simply cannot talk of democracy and freedom and racism and apartheid in the one breath," said Gray.

In a policy statement, widely considered to be the fullest on the present administration's view of its African objectives, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker said the United States would not choose between white and black in Africa. (It will be recalled that Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe told Crocker that the US would have to choose between black and white).

There are many who believe that the US has already chosen to back the white minority regime of South Africa. Said Randall Robinson: "The trouble with the Reagan policy on Africa is that all he (Reagan) knows about the problems of the different regions is that he is on the side of the white man in South Africa."

Like many others in Washington, Congressman Gray is convinced that the Reagan Administration is obsessed with its militaristic approach and its growing

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fever to contain communism. Gray argues that it is because of this that the US Government has declined to recognise the Angolan Government.

The Amendment

The congressman has introduced a Bill to normalise relations with Angola. Gray is undeterred by current efforts of the Reagan Administration to repeal the Clark Amendment. The amendment prohibits American assistance to rebel factions until it has recognised the present Angolan Government – and until a solution is found to the Namibian dispute regarding South African control in the territory in terms of UN Security Council resolution 435.

The Clark Amendment has been a sore point with the Reagan Administration because it prohibits it by law to support any of the rebel factions, including UNITA. United States Government officials told *New African* that the Reagan Administration would continue to seek to repeal the amendment. This comes against a background of reports suggesting that the United States has warmed to the possibility of having Savimbi as an alternative to the present Angolan Government, which it believes to be "communist" and firmly in the Soviet/Cuban camp.

Chester Crocker told a conference earlier this year that events of the last decade had proved only too clearly that the objectives sought in Africa by the United States were increasingly being threatened by political instability, external intervention and declining economic performance. Said Crocker: "Soviet/Cuban/Eastern Bloc intervention in African affairs, the presence of Libyan troops in Chad and the massive transfers of arms by Eastern Bloc nations, all serve to undermine US and Western interests in Africa and to thwart our – and Africa's – objectives."

But Don McHenry and Randall Robinson are at variance with the stated US official position on Africa. It is felt in a number of circles that present American interest in South Africa is both ideological and corporate. That is not the situation with regard to America's position in the rest of Africa.

"Soviet menace"

In some African countries, notably Kenya, Somalia and Egypt, United States interest is largely strategic – a burning desire to contain the "Soviet menace". Elsewhere in Africa, particularly in Nigeria and Zaire and to some extent Zimbabwe, the United States' major concern is its corporate interests. Says Robinson: "The Reagan Administration intends to establish a strong alliance with South Africa."

South Africa, in turn, has become charged with a sense of missionary zeal, believing that the US Government will support it in its controversial undertakings in the region.

Robinson fears that the Reagan Administration has bequeathed to the South Africans a caretaker role in Africa, particularly in Southern Africa, where Pretoria has assumed the role of policeman of the Cape sea route. "The new Reagan Administration appears to trust Pretoria," he says. "They see 'white' South Africa as a permanent fixture in developments in that region."

Don McHenry believes that the United States attitude to the rest of Africa is bound to be one that says "we will do whatever we want to do and you (the African nations) will do nothing about it".

Asked whether the US did not fear possible African retaliation, using weapons such as oil or strategic minerals, McHenry said it was the view of some officials in the Reagan Administration that African countries hardly had a weapon they could use effectively against the United States. Commenting on this, Randall Robinson said: "The trouble with all this is that the US arrogantly believes it has what the Africans badly need."

Most of the politicians and political and military analysts and advisers interviewed by *New African* said they believed that the US had managed to introduce an atmosphere of capitalism versus communism in Africa. The Pretoria Government had succeeded in exploiting the present atmosphere. By presenting itself as a violently anti-communist country energetically resisting Soviet influence in Africa, it had touched the soft underbelly of the Reagan Administration.

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But, cautions McHenry, "he who believes that a friendly policy towards South Africans will influence them to find a peaceful solution in Namibia, and that they will begin to dismantle apartheid within South Africa, knows no better. South Africa is about to do neither."

McHenry believes that the US played right into South African hands. "They have clouded the issue, making it one of communism or the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, instead of what it really is - self-determination." He said the US had conveniently forgotten that the Cuban presence in Angola was the result of Portuguese intransigence. He added: "I believe that the Soviet Union likes to fish in troubled waters. America is stupidly encouraging the waters to remain troubled."

Destabilisation

Like many other observers, McHenry fears that the situation in Southern Africa will deteriorate further. He predicts that the South Africans will extend their campaign of de-stabilisation to Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. "They may weaken SWAPO in this process, but for how long?"

Randall Robinson, who has called for more action from other African nations, told *New African* that he believes "Africans are abused when South Africa moves into Angola with apparent impunity".

There have been other calls for African countries to take stronger action in condemning the current drift of Reagan's policy on Africa. Said Robinson: "It's one thing to be vociferous within the Organisation of African Unity. But it is a totally different matter to take the issue out into the open. Individual countries can make a far stronger impact. There is a need for countries with a high profile in Africa to make their individual positions known on the issue."

Many believe that the gauntlet has been thrown down. That it is now up to the African countries to respond. It is the general view of many intelligent and enlightened people that the problems in South Africa have little to do with communism. Several groups in the United States are planning action to voice their opposition to the Reagan policy and South Africa's campaign of de-stabilisation in Southern Africa.

Congressman Bill Gray has introduced another Bill intended to ban new investment by US firms in South Africa. Introducing it, Gray told Congress: "If we are a people and a nation of moral conscience, we cannot carry on business as usual with this government (South Africa)." Gray noted that South African oppression of its black citizens was harsh and unrelenting. "Not only would it be morally wrong for us to stand silent in the face of such suppression, but it would seriously endanger our relationship with the African continent on which we are becoming increasingly dependent for oil, other natural resources and expanding trade opportunities".

In the aftermath of the Angolan invasion by the South Africans, Congressman Gray has been seeking support among fellow congressmen to get legislation that would restrict the granting of American visas to South Africans.

"It is already hard for black Americans to get visas for South Africa, while it is even more difficult for black South Africans to come to the United States because of restrictions in South Africa. Why should it be so easy for the whites? It is also necessary to introduce legislation banning landing rights for South African Airways in the United States."

Many observers have expressed dismay at the muted reaction of the OAU delegation which met American Secretary of State Alexander Haig in Washington last month. The delegation, led by the Kenyan Foreign Minister Robert Ouko, reportedly told Haig that "African nations are running out of patience waiting for South Africa to grant Namibia independence".

But after a two-hour meeting with Haig, the delegation refrained from direct criticism of Reagan's Africa policy. The delegation also avoided making direct criticism of the US veto at the Security Council. Ouko said only that "Haig told us the United States is committed to implementing the UN resolution calling for independence for Namibia". He added: "We must take him at his word." Later, when pressed by journalists, the Kenyan minister added: "All I can say is we have had a frank exchange of views."

Dangerous drift

There are many who now fear that the United States Administration will use

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the muted criticism of the OAU delegation to mean that the African countries are not really concerned by the new and dangerous American drift in its Africa policy.

American conservative connections with South Africa date back to last November when Ronald Reagan won the US presidency. This gave South Africa encouragement, a new confidence.

The new conservative administration coming in the aftermath of the slightly more liberal and enlightened Carter Administration, has provided South Africa with the "big brotherly" support it had energetically sought from Washington for a long time. Suddenly Pretoria was being described as a "friend" by the new American President. It is no coincidence that America's ultra-conservatives, including that guru of American Right-wing sentiment Jesse Helms, are coming in from the political cold.

Following the ascendancy of Reagan at the White House – and coupled with the South African intelligence report warning politicians that SWAPO would win at least 50 per cent of a Namibia poll – South Africa soon scuttled the Geneva UN conference in January. Almost immediately, cross-border raids into Angola by South African troops increased – allegedly in hot-pursuit of SWAPO insurgents.

In the April meeting between Chester Crocker and South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan, the South Africans made it clear that they considered winning a war against SWAPO an easy game. According to leaked documents (*New African*, August) Malan told Crocker: "We will reach a stage where internal forces in Namibia can militarily defeat SWAPO."

There are an increasing number of Africa specialists who believe the Reagan Africa policy could easily come unstuck. That policy is largely influenced by Reagan's own brand of ultra-conservatism dogma. He is ably supported in the US Senate by the likes of Jesse Helms, Strom Thurmond and others. The other side of the coin represents corporate interests in Africa. There are many observers who feel that in the end it will come to a tussle between the business community, which has dealings with Africa, and the ideological conservatives.

Said one Washington observer: "These two interests are in the end going to clash. They are strange bedfellows." It is generally believed that it is the ideologues who now hold sway in the United States Administration.

Already there have been signs that a confrontation is not far away. During the Senate hearing on the Clark Amendment many corporations testified in favour of the US normalising its relations with Angola. A stable Angola would make for a rewarding relationship between the United States and Africa as a whole, they said. If the Angola boat is rocked too much it would be to the obvious disadvantage of the corporations with Angolan interests, the chief among them being Gulf Oil.

Hard decisions

Elsewhere on the African continent, it is considered that the Reagan policy will inevitably be militarist, reactionary and violently anti-communist. Reflecting on the likely future prospects for Africa, Congressman Gray told *New African* he was apprehensive. "Put it this way", he said. "Under Reagan the going will be rough, very rough. Africa will have to decide how it will react. No one else can do it for the African countries. I am afraid there will be some hard decisions to be made soon," he said.

Meanwhile, there is concern at the United Nations that the Western Contact Group of five nations (United States, Britain, France, Canada, and West Germany) is no longer in harmony. This, officials say, has followed sharp differences within the group after the United States had unilaterally vetoed the resolution condemning South Africa for its invasion of Angola.

Sources at the UN told *New African* it was not known how long the group, which for years has negotiated with the Pretoria Government over the future of Namibia, would remain in disarray.

Speaking at the UN, Zimbabwean Foreign Minister Simon Mangwende called on the contact group to fulfil their "moral obligation" and pressure South Africa to submit to the UN plan "without prevarication".

Mangwende rapped proposals to establish special guarantees for the white minority community in Namibia.

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He added that it was "very strange logic and perhaps a new interpretation of justice" to propose this while the majority lacked basic rights.

Zambian Foreign Minister Lameck Goma branded the US veto on the Security Council resolution as a "shameful exercise of power". He also attacked the US policy statement of Chester Crocker, that the United States would not choose between black and white in Africa.

The choice

Dismissing the US posture, the Zambian minister said: "We in Africa never asked (the United States) to take sides between blacks and whites, nor are we asking any countries to make that choice." Citing the former Lusaka manifesto, he went on: "Our policies are not based upon a racist premise. Africa is asking for a choice to be made between

right and wrong, between justice and injustice."

The Zambian minister said that peaceful or violent change depended on the Western Powers and their contact group. "Individually or collectively they have tremendous human and other resources." He lamented that all this year the Western nations had shown no political will and had now compounded the problem by "being helpful to South Africa, the oppressor."

SWAPO referred to the United States veto and support for South Africa - as a "new unholy alliance".

Consensus in foreign diplomatic circles in the United States - and among American Africa-watchers in Washington and New York - seems to be, albeit unofficially, that the Reagan Administration and America generally will regret their support for the Pretoria Government, a regime regarded internationally as a polecat●

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SOUTH AFRICA

ANC GUERRILLAS SAID TO BE UNDETERRED BY TORTURE, DEATH

London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169 Oct 81 p 34

[Article by Suzanne Cronji: "The Other War: Torture and Death Will Fail To Break Guerillas"]

[Text]

THE THREE young ANC freedom fighters sentenced to death in Pretoria for high treason were "hung head down by leg irons from a tree" during their interrogation by the South African Police, according to a spokesman for the ANC office in London.

The three Africans - Anthony Bobby Tsotsobe, Johannes Shabangu and David Moise - had been tortured by security policemen in a bid to force a confession, the ANC claim. Later in the interrogation process the accused were choked with masks until they were unconscious. The High Court rejected the defence claim that the men had been tortured.

The death sentences were passed on August 19. The freedom fighters were tried for being involved in last year's spectacular attack on one of South Africa's Sasol oil-from-coal plants, and other acts of sabotage.

Tougher line

Last year, after death sentences were passed on three other ANC fighters, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim appealed to the South African Government to "refrain from the executions of persons for acts arising from their opposition to apartheid". The Security Council appealed for clemency.

The latest death sentences were also brought before the Security Council, but a resolution in terms almost identical to the previous one was blocked by the US representative, who objected to the wording.

Yet another sign of Washington's increasing support for the Pretoria regime. But a Security Council appeal on behalf of Tsotsobe and the others was eventually made.

The day after the sentences were passed, the ANC office in Dar es Salaam pledged vengeance if the executions were carried out. The tone of this threat reflected the much tougher line adopted in recent months by the ANC. Earlier, ANC President Oliver Tambo predicted a sharp escalation in military activity against South Africa's racist regime.

Tambo's statement was notable for what appears to be a fundamental change in policy. As he himself noted, the ANC has so far done its utmost to avoid any loss of civilian life in its attacks on military and key industrial targets (see *New African*, July 1981).

But in warning of the increase in military activity, he said that this "is going to involve combat situations in which, I am afraid, civilians are going to be hit".

Tambo was speaking at the state funeral in Salisbury of ANC representative Joel Gqabi, who had been murdered by South African agents, according to the Zimbabwe Government. The killing of Gqabi was no doubt a warning to Zimbabwe not to harbour any ANC "terrorists".

The effect appears to have been the reverse: a few days later the ANC mission in Salisbury issued its first official communique from Zimbabwe. This concerned an ANC rocket attack on South Africa's vast military complex at Voortrekkerhoogte near Pretoria.

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"A taste of things to come" in the words of none other than South Africa's Defence Minister, General Magnus Malan. In its initial reaction to the attack, the South African Government specifically blamed the ANC. But subsequently the South African media were told to delete any reference to the ANC. In General Malan's view, "the primary aim of the enemy is to unnerve, through maximum publicity".

The attack on the military base is only one of many this year. The military authorities in Pretoria admit to 37 ANC acts against key targets in South Africa in the first eight months of 1981. On July 21, 15 explosions rocked two important power stations in the Eastern Transvaal causing extensive damage and plunging large areas into darkness, including the town of Ermelo.

The ANC selects its targets with care, to underline the weaknesses of South Africa's industrial structure. The attack on the power stations came at a time when electricity supplies were dangerously low - down by 22.5 per cent over the previous year - and old, uneconomic power plants had to be brought back into use to meet the demand. After this incident the press was warned not to publish security details because the damaged installations were regarded as "key points" by the Defence Force.

A few days later ANC bombs damaged two car showrooms in Durban - outlets for two motor assembly plants which had victimised striking workers: another calculated political point.

Yet another was the ANC raid last month on a police station only 20 miles from Pretoria, in the "homeland" of BophuthaTwana.

Majority support

There is no doubt that the ANC commands the support of the majority of the black population. When the death sentences were passed on August 19, the condemned men gave the raised fist salute, while demonstrators outside the court, who sang nationalist songs, were dispersed by police dogs.

The funeral of three ANC men last year, killed during a raid on a bank, attracted vast crowds who wished to display solidarity. This belies white South African claims that the ANC operations are hit-and-run raids across borders from neighbouring countries, without popular backing inside the Republic.

But there is no doubt that Pretoria will take revenge against neighbouring countries, as it has already done. Tambo predicted that South Africa would try to promote coups in those states: "Already Mozambicans, Zimbabweans and black South Africans are being trained in their camps".

He hoped, he said, that the White authorities would show themselves to be vulnerable to the ANC campaign much sooner than internationally expected but, in the meantime, "the burden will become heavier all round because the burden increases for South Africa itself" ●

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SOUTH AFRICA

POLICE RAIDS ON SQUATTERS EXPECTED TO PROVE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

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[Article by Bob Hitchcock: 'How the 'Clowns' of Pretoria Are Fouling Their Own Nest']

[Text]

THE PRETORIA GOVERNMENT has a knack of upsetting South Africa's black majority at a time most strategically disastrous to itself.

In 1976, for instance, when additional official repression in the country's African townships became intolerable, especially in Soweto, young Blacks revolted and the uprising left a trail of blood throughout South Africa just as the then Prime Minister, Balthazar John Vorster, was having what to him were vital talks in Germany with Dr Henry Kissinger of the United States.

As a senior West German foreign affairs official remarked to me in Bonn at the time: "The Afrikaners in power in Pretoria are clowns. Unfortunately, their clowning is lethal and millions of people are suffering dreadful hardships through it".

At it again

Last month, and in August, the "clowns" were at it again. Just as the Defence Department and the Defence Force were launching yet another relatively large-scale invasion into the heart of Angola, another department in Cape Town was opening a wound which over the years has turned septic.

With armed police forming the vanguard, the inappropriately named Department of Co-operation and Development moved in at dawn on a sprawling makeshift squatter camp situated between the black township of Nyanga and the site of the once celebrated Crossroads camp.

The object of the exercise was to "deport" the camp's 2,000-odd occupants – all of whom are South Africans in every sense except legal definition – to their poverty-stricken Transkei and Ciskei "homelands" which already are overcrowded and where employment is impossible to find.

Like old Nazi Stormtroopers and the present-day secret police of fascist and communist states, South African officials invariably choose the "dead" period just before dawn to launch their raids against squatters. "A matter of psychology", as a Cape police chief once told me with a wry smile.

No newsman who has witnessed police raids on squatter camps in South Africa can forget the hurt and bewilderment in the eyes of the victims. Nor the ugliness of the contorted faces of their camouflage-clad persecutors.

I have seen passive old men and women, and pregnant women and girls, picked up bodily by burly policemen – both Whites and Blacks – and dashed to the ground in screaming heaps.

Infants, toddlers and primary school youngsters, stiff with fear, are left screaming amid the rubble as parents are herded together like prisoners of war and ordered to squat on their haunches, later to be heaved like bags of mealies into police vehicles.

Tear gas

Unprotected women and children – guilty of no other crime than that of wanting to live with their husbands and

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fathers – are attacked by policemen with dogs, and by that particularly virulent brand of tear-gas that blinds them temporarily and forces them to their knees to choke and vomit. Later, the bulldozers are brought in to demolish the last vestige of the squatters' sanctuary.

To top it all these raids are often ordered by the authorities in mid-winter, when keen air chills the bones and, in the Cape, when torrential rain and gale-force winds are common.

The raids on the African squatters on the outskirts of Cape Town in August and last month followed this now familiar pattern. But there was a new twist to the traumatic proceedings.

Full aliens

For the first time, the South African-born squatters were treated as full aliens under a law controlling foreign immigration. They were transported out of the country of their birth under the same law that would be used against illegal immigrants from Europe, the Soviet Union or Vietnam.

Hundreds of black squatters were caught in the net and the South African authorities erected road blocks near the South Africa-Transkei "border" in a bid to prevent the homeless, hungry people from returning to "white" South Africa.

The Transkei authorities, however, told Pretoria it could not accept the "deportees". Many of the squatters returned to the Cape Town area almost as soon as they were off-loaded in the sterile Transkei, bypassing the roadblocks.

So appalled was France by reports of the brutality and heartlessness of the South African Government that it suggested a joint Western diplomatic approach to Pretoria about the treatment of the squatters. The idea was coolly received by Western envoys, but it drew from the ultra-conservative Reagan Administration a reaffirmation that

Washington viewed South Africa's apartheid policy as repugnant and that the "US goal is to assist forces seeking constructive change in that country".

Meanwhile, back at the Cape Town squatter camp near Nyanga, the authorities were busy burning the tattered plastic, canvas and cardboard sheets used by the squatters to shelter from the winter storms.

Amid the confusion, the man who initially ordered the demolition of the camp and the "deportation" of its inhabitants – Co-operation and Development Minister Piet Koornhof – was blaming the squatters for their plight, claiming that the action had been necessary to "defuse the situation" after the squatters had rejected a compromise suggested by the government.

This had contained two elements, he said – the legalisation of those squatters who could show they had jobs, and an offer to find work for others elsewhere. Why had the squatters not shown interest in the proposition? Minister Koornhof asked. He did not have to wait long for a reply.

One loser

Said a squatters' spokesman: "The offer has been rejected because the legalisation would not have extended to wives and children of those men in work. Nor do the squatters wish to leave the Cape Town area".

This is a contest of wills. Some observers believe the squatters – battered as they are – won the confrontation.

Meanwhile, as tens of thousand of African, "Coloured" and Asian squatters throughout the country become increasingly stubborn and vocal, they constitute a major part of a loose-knit nationwide passive resistance campaign.

Ultimately, in this battle of wills, there can be only one loser – the South African Government●

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END